Garrett Metal Detectors explores emerging trends in entrance security 

Decades ago, the entrance security world was divided between the haves and the have nots, reports Garrett Metal Detectors.

There were once venues and facilities that thought actively about security and there were others that lacked security more sophisticated than a door lock.

Now, a quarter of the way through the 21^st century, that is no longer the case for much of the world.  

Cameras and electronic door locks are ubiquitous, while more active security measures like bag scanners, metal detectors and other sophisticated access control tools are reaching markets that would not previously consider their use.

Today’s security landscape is no longer focused on the have and have not. Rather, it is divided by a question of patron-optimisation versus threat-minimisation. 

A tale of two entrances 

Consider briefly two hypothetical facility entrances: Entrance A is a large stadium; entrance B is a busy courthouse.

Both have real security hazards to address. The stadium worries about shootings, knives in the hands of rowdy fans and other contraband like drugs and alcohol.

The courthouse similarly wants to eliminate unauthorised weapons and keep mind-altering substances out.  

If this was all we knew about their security context, we might assume that the stadium and the courthouse would adopt similar security postures, but they do not.

That’s because there is a lot more to the entrance security context of these two facilities than their identified threats.

Risks and motives are not evenly distributed – alcohol smuggling is more common in stadiums, while a targeted attack on an employee is more likely at a courthouse.

But what if the differences in security posture between entrance A and entrance B cannot be fully explained by perceived risk? 

Taking for granted that both facilities do care about the safety of their patrons and staff, the fundamental difference between a stadium and a courthouse is one of philosophy.

The stadium will almost always adopt a more relaxed security posture, but not because they do not care about security. Instead, they have a set of competing legitimate interests that can be summed up as patron-optimising interests.

Stadiums are entertainment complexes and they must look the part.  

So, security technology must blend with the complex or recede into the background (a luxury for which stadiums often pay a premium).

Nobody is compelled to visit a stadium and an unvisited stadium will quickly go out of business. So, facility security must not produce excessive friction for its patrons or they will stop coming.

Patrons prevented from entering by security spend zero dollars on concessions and are very likely not to return.

It may be tempting for security-minded professionals and entrance B type-facilities to point out the perverse incentives that these realities create and even disparage the lack of security at these venues, but that would be unfair to the entrance A venue.  

These incentives determine the survival of businesses enjoyed by billions of people worldwide, and they affect even the most hardened entrance B facilities.

However, entrance A operators should not therefore dismiss the fact that these realities do create incentives to act in ways that will critically compromise their security.

When aesthetics, frictionless entry and permissive security standards are elevated too highly in the mind of the stadium’s decision-makers, the whole enterprise can devolve into security theatre and cynical lawsuit insurance. 

To protect against this risk, it is important to specifically identify threats. Vague talk of keeping guns and knives out will not do, but a specific list of real-world threats to identify will keep real concerns from overpowering fundamental concerns.

Do you have an example of the smallest knife or gun you want to catch? Do you have the aluminium flask that keeps slipping through security? Developing and maintaining these must-detect/must-prevent test pieces will give you a real sense of ownership over your security and confidence in your evaluations of your procedures. 

On the other hand, the courthouse entrance is governed by a different set of primary incentives. A courthouse will naturally adopt a more rigorous security posture, but not necessarily because they care more about security.

They are not paid for the number of people who show up for jury selection; attendance is mandatory for most visitors and being barred from entry for security reasons is just as likely to get someone back in the courthouse as it is to keep them out.

Facility management for a courthouse does not have competing needs for entrance security. In other words, entrance B is free to focus on threat-minimisation. 

Within the constraints of space, staff and budget they can maximise their alignment of entrance security processes with their threat detection goals.

At first glance, this philosophy is the more security-minded of the two, but that isn’t wholly true. It would be correct to say that entrance B is more tailored to a security mindset in that the courthouse context furnishes fewer distractions and countervailing incentives, but that does not mean that the actual concern for security is greater there than at entrance A.

Additionally, the concerns of entrance A are always active, even in a facility that looks like entrance B. 

For example, unnecessary friction at a courthouse entrance can stress staff, frustrate visitors and contribute to a hostile atmosphere in the courtroom.

Ultimately, thinking only about the security of the entrance can degrade security outcomes too, by creating additional resistance to security initiatives.

To mitigate this risk, it is important to test the systems in place for entrance security and develop a refine-and-improve mindset.  

With key security goals firmly in mind, observe how the experience of security can be improved.an signage be updated and clarified? Can staff be retrained? Can regulars be given additional insights into how to make their security experience more seamless? What new technology might be available that meets detection/prevention requirements in a more people-friendly way? Try the new methods and see if the hypothesis produces the promised results.

Don’t give up on the security mindset your facility allows, rather strive to improve cooperation between securers and securees. 

More accepting, more secure 

In the end, these two philosophies come from distinct worlds, but they have a lot to teach each other. The world will be more accepting of security if we learn the lessons of the patron-optimising stadium and it will be more secure if it adopts the rigorous mindset of the threat-minimizing courthouse.

The way to avoid listing too far in one direction is accountability.  

For the former, it is accountability to security standards – minimum performance requirements that describe security results.

For the latter, it is accountability to patrons and staff via continuing self-education on pain points in their security system.

This isn’t just true for end users, but also for security providers. Technology must continue to evolve to satisfy both streams, and expert security companies must still find ways to make high-spec technology welcome to the people it protects. 

If you are looking for entrance security that thinks carefully about patron-optimisation and threat-minimisation, Garrett Metal Detectors has more than 40 years of experience providing entrance security to a diverse and global customer base.

We understand the fundamental need for security and the human factors that make it complicated and we are ready to help you take the next step in securing your facility the way that works for you.