ISJ hears exclusively from Dr Jeffrey Brodeur, Vertical Market Manager for Safety and Security at Rigaku Analytical Devices.
The global risk landscape has evolved into one of persistent conflict, and the fallout includes rising tensions, impatience and a heightened risk of violence across almost every sector of society.
The threat of chemical incidents at large-scale events is growing in complexity and must be factored into security planning.
Chemical agent attacks have long been the domain of nation-states, but today they are as far away as your local hardware store or a medical facility, where lone wolves, proxy networks and terror cells can obtain everyday ingredients and create deadly weapons with little effort.
The Securitas’ Annual Intelligence Estimate 2026 describes the security landscape as ‘convergent’, where geopolitical disruptions, hybrid threats and information disorder increasingly overlap.
The report states that kinetic threats remain a risk, but an “interconnected security strategy” is required and must cover chemical threats.
In fact, Securitas recommends preparing for chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats.
As old alliances fade and new ones form, major events around the world are directly at risk of chemical agent attacks, whether they are sporting mega-events, such as the 2026 FIFA World Cup in North America or political gatherings, such as the 2026 NATO Summit in Turkey.
These and other events are prime targets for domestic extremists, disruption campaigns and hostile foreign actors seeking publicity or to humiliate perceived enemies.
Some security leaders may discount the option of chemical attacks since they “have never happened here,” but the 1995 Sarin attack in Tokyo’s subways and the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001 were also unthinkable before they happened.
This attitude is a blind spot in event risk management because security managers don’t know how many past attempts failed.
This was the case with the cult that released Sarin gas in Tokyo in 1995.
It was only years later that authorities found out that in 1993, the cult had sprayed Anthrax into the air from a rooftop in the hopes of killing as many people as possible.
The plan failed, but the cult learned from this and other mistakes and launched the successful Sarin attack two years later.
Weaponising pharmaceuticals and industrial chemicals
In Iraq, the Islamic State (ISIS) had no access to military-grade chemical weapons, but was able to construct deadly weapons from precursor materials easily available in its environment.
Universities and medical research centers often store large quantities of hazardous chemicals without strict security controls.
Other deadly chemical concoctions can be manufactured in someone’s basement without access to restricted materials or complex equipment, created from insecticides and other materials available at a local hardware store.
In 2025, for example, a man in Arkansas, USA, was jailed for producing jars of ricin on his property.
The threat of these chemicals is more dangerous today as ‘mosaic defence’ operations expand. Mosaic operations refer to the rise of proxy actors, local organisations and militant groups that operate independently, without requiring their sponsors’ plans or permissions.
Not only does this provide plausible deniability for the nation-states or organisations funding them, but autonomous planning and material sourcing also make it harder to uncover their plans.
Proxies operating independently degrade the intelligence usually available from inter-organisational communications (SIGINT), leaving only human intelligence (HUMINT), which takes far longer to reach authorities, as someone has to make a call or arrange a meeting to pass the information along.
The most difficult independent operation to detect and prevent is when sympathisers act in isolation as lone wolves.
In this scenario, which the world has already seen result in death and physical harm, a single person plans and attacks without anyone knowing what they are doing until they act.
Drones for attack, defence and distraction
Adding fuel to the fire, chemical attacks are supported by technology, such as drones.
The widespread availability of commercial drones enables both lone-wolf actors and organised groups to bypass traditional ground security measures, maximising impact with minimal personal exposure.
These aerial vehicles are also very useful for reconnaissance, enabling malicious actors to plan and monitor events more effectively.
On the positive side, they are also enabling tools for security teams using facial biometrics or license plate recognition.
They can also create operational distractions for security teams.
While everyone, including the security team, watches a drone, threat actors can use the distraction to release toxic agents into a crowd.
Drones, therefore, must also be integrated into security planning, not only as kinetic delivery mechanisms, but also as chemical dispersal vehicles.
If one of these vehicles passes security defences and sprays toxic chemicals on a crowd, the consequences can be deadly.
However, protecting against drone attacks is not straightforward, especially in built-up areas like cities.
To ensure safety, risk managers need to establish at least three defensive layers for effective interdiction.
Three defensive layers may seem like overkill for a sporting event, but threat actors do their homework and know how many drones the defensive team can handle at any one time.
They then send in twice that number to overwhelm the security operation’s defence strategies.
Layered defences will enable security teams to identify threats from afar and interdict them in phases before they reach their targets.
Security teams must avoid the distraction of drones, as the threat of chemical attacks remains varied.
Chemicals can be concealed in common items like water bottles and released at a predetermined time.
Therefore, security personnel require training to identify threats beyond conventional weapons, specifically to detect individuals attempting to introduce suspicious liquids or powders into restricted zones.
If they make it past the perimeter, any unusual behaviour should be flagged by surveillance systems or patrolling guards.
In indoor settings, drones may not play a significant role, but chemical agents have a greater impact because they have nowhere to go, and HVAC systems often recirculate them throughout the venue.
VIP security teams at government events will generally have their own evacuation protocols, limiting the likelihood of mass casualties.
However, in a mixed environment, such as the upcoming COP31 (UN Climate Change Conference) in Turkey in November, where thousands of people from all walks of life will be present, the danger of chaos-induced casualties once again increases.
The asymmetry of mass panic
Evacuation is arguably the most dangerous and deadly part of a chemical attack as people panic and run, inadvertently creating chaos.
They may fall from stands, accidentally or when pushed by other terrified people, or they may be trampled as everyone tries to flee.
The vulnerable population, usually children or the elderly, is at particular risk in panic situations.
At international events, the diversity of attendees can introduce additional communication challenges, making it more difficult to ensure that emergency instructions are clearly understood by all.
In all events where many people are expected, evacuation plans are always put in place well before the event. Unfortunately, these are also designed for kinetic attacks.
A chemical attack may trigger an evacuation, only to be followed by another attack that blocks one of the evacuation routes.
Security personnel must be trained to detect and block contaminated routes and direct crowds to safe paths in the event of a worst-case scenario.
This presumes they have the equipment to detect dangerous gases or liquids or that sensors are installed in critical areas to continuously sample the air for anomalous substances.
An often-ignored risk is outside the venue.
People will often escape the stadium or conference venue and gather outside in large, frightened crowds, unsure what happened or what to do next.
This presents another viable and easy target where many people can be assaulted by chemical agents, including from drones kept in reserve for exactly this opportunity.
Proactive preparation and readiness
To address the new risks posed by known and unknown assailants, security preparations for major events must now encompass the full range of possible attacks.
Security teams require an interconnected security strategy in which security teams make valid assumptions that such attacks are plausible, ensuring that risk assessments and preparations reflect the full spectrum of modern threats.
A security team will rarely have all the security resources required, both human and technological.
The only way to prepare for an attack is to conduct vulnerability audits to identify weaknesses and reinforce them by expanding the operational scope of existing resources.
Every pair of eyes and ears, and every technical sensor, is an intelligence-gathering option and personnel on-site and in command-and-control centers must be trained to integrate any intelligence into the risk mitigation processes.
Large events are announced well in advance, giving attackers ample time to plan and adapt to security measures.
The vulnerability audits and mitigation plans must therefore be developed and resources allocated and tested repeatedly to ensure as few weak points as possible remain.
Mitigation processes are not only tabletop exercises; they should also be actively rehearsed by red (attacking) and blue (defending) teams with feedback integrated into updated mitigation preparations.
It is also critical that, while lessons should be learned from other events, preparations for a chemical attack cannot be adopted from another event or location as a template.
Security is not a one-size-fits-all approach.
The threat environment is dynamic, and each event must rely on its own defenses based on the environment.
Address the holistic threat environment
Moreover, security risk assessments must look beyond traditional gas or chemical detectors, as these devices do not always provide the timely, accurate information needed to develop a tactical plan.
They are also limited in the substances they can identify.
Modern presumptive analysis tools are far more reliable and deliver accurate information faster, capable of detecting thousands of chemical agents and toxins with over 90% accuracy in a minute or less.
Many are also portable and can be carried by specific personnel in critical areas.
Access to and training in the use of presumptive analysis should be standard for security personnel, regardless of their role.
Security leadership will be able to make informed decisions based on the fidelity of information from these tools, leading to better tactical decisions and improved safety for all.
Accurate information on the chemicals used in attacks, as provided by presumptive analysis equipment, will also alert first responders and hospitals as to what they should prepare for.
Chemical threats at major events can no longer be ignored. From easily accessible dangerous chemicals to advanced drone delivery systems, the dynamic risk landscape means that chemical attacks are a threat scenario that must be considered.
Security is not a one-size-fits-all template but a continuously evolving, active process that requires focus and ongoing risk assessment, analysis and preparation.
Only through adaptive planning, consistent training, technological readiness and access to presumptive analysis equipment can cities hosting major events move beyond reactive responses and proactively prepare for the full range of modern conflicts.
